How Open Should Open Source Be?

Adam Barth
Google
adam@adambarth.com

Saung Li
CS Division, UC Berkeley
shadowcwal@berkeley.edu

Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
Microsoft Research
ben.rubinstein@microsoft.com

Dawn Song
CS Division, UC Berkeley
dawnsong@eecs.berkeley.edu

Abstract—Many open-source projects land security fixes in public repositories before shipping these patches to users. This paper presents attacks on such projects—taking Firefox as a case-study—that exploit patch metadata to efficiently search for security patches prior to shipping. Using access-restricted bug reports linked from patch descriptions, security patches can be immediately identified for 260 out of 300 days of Firefox 3 development. In response to Mozilla obfuscating descriptions, we show that machine learning can exploit metadata such as patch author to search for security patches, extending the total window of vulnerability by 5 months in an 8 month period when examining up to two patches daily. Finally we present strong evidence that further metadata obfuscation is unlikely to prevent information leaks, and we argue that open-source projects instead ought to keep security patches secret until they are ready to be released.

Keywords-open-source software security; information leakage; learning-based attacks

I. INTRODUCTION

Many open-source software development projects, such as Firefox, Chromium, Apache, the Linux kernel, and OpenSSL, produce software that is run by hundreds of millions of users and machines. Following the open-source spirit, these projects make all code changes immediately visible to the public in open code repositories, including landing fixes to security vulnerabilities in public development branches before publicly announcing the vulnerability and providing an updated version to end users. This common practice raises the question of whether this extreme openness increases the window of vulnerability by enabling attackers to discover vulnerabilities earlier in the security life-cycle, e.g., via program analysis [1]. The conventional wisdom is that detecting these security patches is made prohibitively difficult because the patches are hidden among a cacophony of non-security changes. For example, the central Firefox repository receives, on average, 38.6 patches per day, of which 0.34 fix security vulnerabilities. Recently, blackhats in the Metasploit project have used the “description” metadata field to find Firefox patches that refer to non-public bug numbers [2].

The Firefox developers have responded by obfuscating the description field, but where does this cat-and-mouse game end?

In this paper, we analyze information leaks in open-source life-cycles, through a case-study on Firefox 3 and 3.5, to answer three key questions: (1) Does the metadata associated with patches in the source code repository contain information about whether the patch is security sensitive? (2) Using this information as a guide, how much less effort does an attacker need to expend to find unannounced security vulnerabilities? (3) By how much do these information leaks increase the total window of vulnerability? We do not study the task of reverse engineering exploits from patches [1], but instead focus on prioritizing the search for security patches to decrease attack cost. In so doing we make several contributions:

- For all but 40 out of 300 days of Firefox 3 active development, a simple join of Firefox’s repository and bug tracker identifies a newly landed security patch.
- Even if the patch-bug ID link is obfuscated perfectly, off-the-shelf machine learning can rank patches using remaining metadata such that examining up to two patches daily will add an extra 5 months of vulnerability within an 8 month period of Firefox 3 development.
- We offer strong evidence that obfuscating patch metadata achieves diminishing returns, and even under complete obfuscation a random ranker adds over 2 months of vulnerability by examining just 2 patches daily.
- We argue that instead of obfuscating metadata, open-source projects like Firefox should land security patches in a private release branch accessible to trusted testers.

We first quantify the severity of information leaks due to Firefox’s bug tracker Bugzilla. Upon arrival of a new patch in the mozilla-central main development trunk, it is a simple matter for an attacker to parse the patch’s description field for a bug ID and then consult Bugzilla for the corresponding bug history. We show that for the vast majority of days of active Firefox development, a corresponding Bugzilla bug report page was access restricted at the time of landing, divulging the patch’s nature as fixing a vulnerability, in which case the attacker need only reverse-engineer one patch to find a zero-day vulnerability.

Prompted by Metasploit blackhats exploiting this information leak, Mozilla recently began obfuscating patch descriptions [2]. Given the wealth of metadata still available, including patch author, the set of files modified, and the size of these modifications, we conjectured that machine learning could significantly narrow an attacker’s search space of patches. While we show that each feature individually
contains little information about whether patches are security sensitive, our experiments on Firefox show that a non-linear combination of features provides valuable guidance for attackers. Our attack uses an off-the-shelf implementation of a support vector machine (SVM) trained to discriminate between security and non-security patches based on non-description metadata. We then use the SVM to rank newly-landed patches by likelihood of fixing a vulnerability. We measure the cost to the adversary by attacker effort—the number of patches the attacker would need to examine before finding the first vulnerability; for over a third of an 8 month period of Firefox 3, an SVM-assisted attacker discovers a security patch upon the first patch examined daily. We measure the benefit to the attacker by the increase to the window of vulnerability; an attacker who examines the top two patches ranked by the detection algorithm each day will add an extra 148 days of vulnerability to the 229 day period we study, representing a 6.4-fold increase over the window of vulnerability caused by the latency in deploying security updates.

In performing the cost-benefit analysis of the SVM ranker, we also consider a random ranker which searches through recently landed patches in random order. While the random ranker serves as a benchmark with which to judge the SVM’s performance, it demonstrates that even under perfect obfuscation of all patch metadata, an attacker need not expend significant effort to yield moderate results.

Our results suggest that Firefox should change its security life-cycle to avoid leaking information about unannounced vulnerabilities in its public source code repositories. Instead of landing security patches in the central repository, Firefox developers should land security patches in a private release branch that is available only to a set of trusted testers. The developers can then merge the patches into the public repository at the same time they release the security update to all users and announce the vulnerability.

Although we study Firefox specifically, we believe our results generalize to other open-source projects, including Chromium, Apache, the Linux kernel, and OpenSSL, which land vulnerability fixes in public repositories before announcing the vulnerability and making security updates available. However, we choose to study these issues in Firefox because Firefox has a state-of-the-art process for responding to vulnerability reports and publishes the ground truth about which patches fix security vulnerabilities [3].

Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the existing Firefox security life-cycle. Section III lays out the dataset we analyze. Section IV explains our methodology. Section V presents our results. Section VI recommends a secure security life-cycle. Section VII concludes.
6) **Security update applied.** Once a user’s auto-update client receives an updated version of the Firefox binary and the user chooses to install the binary, Firefox updates itself. Upon installation, the user is protected from an attacker exploiting the vulnerability. Previous work \cite{1} has analyzed the dynamics between steps \cite{4} and \cite{6}, finding that the user experience and download size have a dramatic effect on the time delay and, hence, the window of vulnerability. With a sufficiently well-designed update experience, browser vendors can reduce the lag between \cite{4} and \cite{6} to a matter of days. Recent releases of Firefox have an improved update experience that reduces the window of vulnerability between steps \cite{4} and \cite{6}.

However, not as much attention has been paid to the dynamics between steps \cite{1} and \cite{4}, likely because most people make the assumption that little is revealed about a vulnerability until the vulnerability is intentionally disclosed in step \cite{4}. Unfortunately, there are a number of information leaks in this process that invalidate that assumption.

**B. Information Leaks in Each Stage**

Each stage in the vulnerability life-cycle leaks some amount of information about vulnerabilities to potential attackers. For example, even step \cite{1} leaks information because bug numbers are issued sequentially and a brute-force attack can determine which are “forbidden” and hence represent security vulnerabilities. Of course, simply knowing that a vulnerability was reported to Firefox does not give an attacker much useful information for creating an exploit.

More information is leaked in step \cite{2} when developers land security patches in mozilla-central because mozilla-central is a public repository. It is unclear, *a priori*, whether an attacker will be able to find security patches landing in mozilla-central because these security patches are landed amid a “thundering herd” of other patches (cf. Figure \cite{3}), but if an attacker can detect that a patch fixes a security vulnerability, the attacker can learn information about that vulnerability. For example, the attacker learns where in the code base the vulnerability exists. If the patch fixes a vulnerability by adding a bounds check, the attacker can look for program inputs that generate large buffers of the checked type. In this paper, we do not evaluate the difficulty of reverse engineering an exploit from a vulnerability fix, but there has been some previous work \cite{1} on reverse engineering exploits from binary patches (which is, of course, more difficult than reverse engineering exploits from source patches). Instead we focus on reducing attacker effort through efficient methods for prioritizing their search.

### III. Analysis Goals and Setup

In this section, we describe the dataset and the performance metrics for searching for security patches.

**A. Dataset**

**Set of Patches.** In our experiment, we focused on the complete life-cycle of Firefox 3, which lasted over 12 months, contained 14,416 non-security patches, 125 security patches, and 12 security updates. We use publicly available data starting from the release of Firefox 3 and ending with the release of Firefox 3.5. Also, to strengthen our results, we focus on the mozilla-central repository, which receives the vast majority of Firefox development effort. We cloned the entire mozilla-central repository to our experimental machines to identify all patches during the life-cycle of Firefox 3. We ignore the release branches to evaluate how well our search methods are able to find security fixes amid mainline development (see Figure \cite{2}).
Although we focus our attention to Firefox 3, we repeat our results on Firefox 3.5 and expect our results to generalize to other releases of Firefox and to other open-source projects. Firefox 3.5 was released June 30, 2009 and remained active until the release of Firefox 3.6 on January 21, 2010. During this 6 month period, 7 minor releases to Firefox were made ending with Firefox 3.5.7 on January 5, 2010. During the 6 month period, 7,033 patches were landed of which 54 fixed vulnerabilities.

Ground Truth. We determined the “ground truth” of whether a patch fixes a security vulnerability by examining the list of known vulnerabilities published by Firefox [3]. Each list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures on the known vulnerability web page contains a link to one or more entries in Bugzilla. At the time we crawled these bug entries (after disclosure), the entries were public and contained links to the Mercurial commits that fixed the vulnerabilities (both in mozilla-central and in the release branches). Our crawler harvested these links and extracted the unique identifier for each patch.

The known vulnerability page dates each vulnerability disclosure, and we assume that these disclosure dates are accurate. Each bug entry is timestamped with its creation date and every message on the bug thread is dated as well. Finally, the mozilla-central pushlog website contains the date and time of every change in the “pushlog,” which we also assume is authoritative.

B. Attack Performance Metrics

We consider attackers who search for security patches in open-source repositories, with the goal of reverse-engineering them to produce zero-day exploits. We focus on three different methods for ranking patches for an attacker to search through, to find a security vulnerability. Each search method can be thought of as producing a ranking on the pool of recently landed patches, where better rankings place (at least) one security patch higher than non-security patches. The attacker examines the landed patches in rank order, until a security patch is found. The ranker’s usefulness, as formalized below, lies in the reduction to attacker effort and in the increase to the window of vulnerability.

1) Cost of Vulnerability Discovery: Attacker Effort: Given a set of patches and a ranking function, we call the rank of the first true security patch the attacker effort. This quantity reflects the number of patches the attacker has to examine when searching the ranked list before finding the first patch that fixes a security vulnerability. For example, if the third-highest ranked patch actually fixes a security vulnerability, then the attacker needs to examine three patches before finding the vulnerability, resulting in an attacker effort of three. Using this metric, we can compute the percent of days on which an attacker who expends a given effort will be able to find a security patch.

2) Benefit for the Attacker: Window of Vulnerability: Another metric we propose is the increase to the window of vulnerability due to the assistance of a ranker. In particular, an attacker who discovers a vulnerability \( d \) days before the next security update increases the total window of vulnerability for Firefox users by \( d \) days. (Notice that knowing of multiple vulnerabilities simultaneously does not increase the aggregate window of vulnerability because knowing multiple vulnerabilities simultaneously is redundant.)

Previous work [6] explores the effectiveness of browser update mechanisms, finding that security updates take some amount of time to propagate to users. In particular, they measured the cumulative distribution of the number of days users take to update their browsers after security updates [6, Figure 3]. After about 10 days, the penetration growth rate rapidly decreases, asymptotically approaching about 80%. By integrating the area above the CDF up to 80%, we can estimate the expected number of days a user takes to update Firefox 3 conditioned that they are in the first 80% who update. We estimate this quantity, the post-release window of vulnerability, to be 3.4 days, which we use as a baseline value for comparing windows of vulnerability.

IV. METHODOLOGY

In this section, we describe the methodology we use to analyze information leaks in the open-source security life-cycle. We present three security patch search methods, by order of decreasing levels of patch metadata used.
A. Exploiting Patch Description and Bug History

Our simplest approach to discovering security patches is an attack recently observed in the wild [2]. A metadata field which regularly references the number of the bug fixed by the patch (cf. Figure 3). When a new patch lands, the attacker can parse the description field for bug numbers, and query Bugzilla for the corresponding bug history. If the bug history page is access restricted (cf. Figure 1) or it records a previous core-security add/remove event (a flag indicating that access to the bug report is restricted to the security team), then the attacker can be confident that the landed patch fixes a vulnerability. After crawling all patches in mozilla-central we simulated this attack by parsing description fields and querying Bugzilla; if an add/remove event occurred prior to the simulated day of examination then we infer that an attacker would have correctly deemed the patch to be security-related.

B. A Learning-Based Ranker

Given a collection of past patches, an attacker can label them based on whether the patches have been announced as vulnerability fixes. Using these labels, the attacker can train a statistical machine learning algorithm to predict whether a new patch fixes an unannounced vulnerability—a supervised binary classification problem. We consider learners that output a real-valued confidence for their predictions. The attacker can use these confidence values to rank a set of patches, before examining the patches in rank order.

Features used by the Learner. There are a number of features we could use to identify security patches. When Mozilla became aware of the previous attack, they began to take steps to obfuscate patch descriptions [2]. Obfuscating and de-obfuscating the patch description is clearly a cat-and-mouse game. To simulate perfect obfuscation of the patch description by the Firefox developers, we analyze information leaks in other metadata associated with each patch (cf. Figure 3).

- **Author.** We hypothesize that information about the patch author (the developer who wrote the patch) will leak a sizable amount of information because Firefox has a security team [4] that is responsible for fixing security vulnerabilities. Most members of the Firefox community do not have access to security bugs and are unlikely to write security patches.

- **Top-level directory.** For each file that was modified by the patch, we observe the top-level directory in the repository that contained the file. In the Firefox directory structure, the top-level directory roughly corresponds to the module containing the file. If a patch touches more than one top-level directory, we pick the directory that contains the most modified files.

- **File type.** For each file that a patch modified, we observe the file’s extension to impute the file’s type. E.g., Firefox patches often modify C++ implementation files, interface description files, and XML user interface descriptions. If a patch touches more than one type of file, we pick the type with the most modified files.

- **Patch size.** We observe a number of size metrics for each patch, including the total size of the diff in characters, the number of lines in the diff, the number of files in the diff, and the average size of all modified files. Although these features are highly correlated, the SVM’s ability to model non-linear patterns lets us take advantage of all these features.

- **Temporal.** The timestamp for each patch reveals the time of day and the day of week the patch was landed in the mozilla-central repository. We include these features in case, for example, some developers prefer to land security fixes at night or on the weekends.

Although these features are harder to obfuscate than the free-form description field, we do not claim that these features cannot be obfuscated. Instead, we claim that there are a large number of small information leaks that can be combined to detect security patches. Of course, this set of features is far from exhaustive and serves only as a lower bound on the attacker’s abilities.

Learning Algorithm. For our detection algorithm, we use the popular libsvm library for support vector machine (SVM) learning [7]. Although we could improve our metrics by tuning the learning algorithm, we choose to use the default configuration to strengthen our conclusions—extracting basic features (as detailed above) and running libsvm in its default configuration requires only basic knowledge of Python and almost no expertise in machine learning.

Support vector machines perform supervised binary classification by learning a maximum-margin hyperplane in a high-dimensional feature space [8]–[10]. Many feature mappings are possible, and the default libsvm configuration uses the feature mapping induced by the RBF kernel, which takes a parameter $\gamma$ that controls kernel width. The SVM takes another parameter $C$, which controls regularization. An attacker need not know how to set these parameters because libsvm chooses the parameters that optimize 5-fold cross-validation estimates over a grid of $(C, \gamma)$ pairs. The optimizing pair is then used to train the final model. We enable a feature of libsvm that learns posterior probability estimates $Pr \left( \text{patch fixes a vulnerability} \mid \text{patch} \right)$ rather than security/non-security class predictions [11]. We refer to these posterior probabilities as probabilities or scores.

We present nominal features (author, top-level directory, and file type) to the SVM as binary vectors. For example, the $i^{th}$ author out of $N$ developers in the Firefox project is represented as $N - 1$ zeros and a single 1 in the $i^{th}$ position.

After training an SVM on patches labeled as security or
non-security, we can use the SVM to rank a set of previously unseen patches by ordering the patches in decreasing order of score. If the SVM is given sufficient training data, we expect the higher-ranked patches to be more likely to fix vulnerabilities. As we show in Section V, even though the SVM scores are unsuitable for classification, they are an effective means for ranking patches.

Note that detecting patches that repair vulnerabilities can be cast as learning problems other than scalar-valued supervised classification. For example, we could take a more direct approach via ranking or ordinal regression (although these again do not directly optimize our primary interest: having one security patch ranked high). However, we use an SVM because it balances statistical performance for learning highly non-linear decision rules and availability of off-the-shelf software appropriate for data mining novices.

**Online Learning.** To limit the detector to information available to real attackers, we perform the following simulation using the dates collected in our data set. For each day, starting on the day between major releases of Firefox, we
perform the following steps:

1) We train a fresh SVM on all the patches landed in the repository between the day Firefox 3 was released and the most recent security update before the current day, labeling each patch according to the publicly known vulnerabilities list.

2) We then use the trained SVM to rank all the patches landed since the most recent security update.

After running the complete online simulation, we observe the highest ranking received by a real vulnerability fix on each day. This ranking corresponds to the SVM-assisted attacker effort for that day.

C. The Random Ranker

To model an attacker searching for security patches under complete metadata obfuscation, we consider a random ranker who examines available patches in a random order. By comparing this ranker with the SVM, we may gain insight into the amount of information leaked by seemingly innocuous patch metadata.

We model the random ranker as selecting patches one-at-a-time, uniformly-at-random without replacement from the pool of patches available in mozilla-central. The attacker’s effort is the random number \( X \) of patches examined up to and including the first patch drawn that fixes a vulnerability. We summarize the cost of using unassisted random ranking via the expected attacker effort, which we derive in Appendix A to be

\[
E[X] = \left( \frac{n}{n_s} \right)^{n-1} \sum_{x=1}^{n-n_s+1} x \left( \frac{n-x}{n_s-1} \right),
\]

where \( n > 0 \) is the total number of available patches, and \( 1 \leq n_s < n \) is the number of these that fix vulnerabilities.

The probability mass and expectation of \( X \) are explored in Figures 4 and 5. For \( n_s = 1 \) the distribution of effort is uniform; and as the number of security patches increases under a constant pool size, mass quickly concentrates on lower effort (note that in each figure attacker effort is depicted on a log scale). Similarly the significant effect of varying \( n_s \) on the expected effort can be seen in Figure 5.

The expected increase to the window of vulnerability is also derived in Appendix A. Both expected cost and benefit metrics can be efficiently computed exactly for the random ranker, given patch counts \( n \) and \( n_s \).

Figures 6 and 7 show the random ranker’s expected cost and benefit, for a typical Firefox 3 inter-point release cycle with constant fractions of security patches; in both cases effort is shown on a log scale. The first figure shows that attacker effort increases under a growing pool of patches, with constant fraction being security-related. For a typical cycle (of length 31 days), typical patch landing rate (of 39 patches daily) and fixed fraction of security-related landed patches, Figure 7 shows the expected window increase as a function of daily budget. Again we see a great difference over increasing proportions of security patches, and the effect of proportion on the dependence of benefit on budget.

Since the average fraction of security-related patches for Firefox 3 is 0.0085, the curves at \( 10^{-2} \) should approximate the performance of the random ranker for Firefox 3 as is verified in Section V. By including curves at atypical security patch rates (from the perspective of Firefox) we offer a preview of the cost and benefit achieved by the random ranker as applied to other open-source projects.

V. RESULTS

We now present results of searching for Firefox security patches. We first explore searching using the patch description and Bugzilla, we then explore the discriminative power of the individual features, and finally we evaluate and compare SVM-assisted search and random search.

A. Exploiting Patch Description and Bug History

We simulated the search for security patches described in Section IV-A that parses patch description fields for bug numbers, queries Bugzilla, and then uses evidence of core-security add/drop events or access restriction of the bug report pages to determine which patches fix vulnerabilities. The attacker effort due to search is essentially naught—only a handful of HTTP requests are submitted per landed patch, and no source code need be analyzed. When executed daily over 300 days of Firefox 3 development, a security patch is
found on all but 40 days yielding a total window of vulnerability increase (summed over all inter-release periods) of a staggering 260 days. We obtained similar results on Firefox 3.5 over a period of 232 days with an aggregate window of vulnerability increase of 219 days. As an attacker may wish to find more than one security patch at a time, we re-ran the attack terminating the search in each inter-release cycle only when the required number of security patches were discovered. Figure 8 displays the resulting increases to the vulnerability windows as a function of number of security patches desired. The window increase drops slightly to 247 and 238 days total, when the required number of security patches grows to 2 and 3 respectively.

By exploiting patch descriptions and the nature of security patches leaked by the Firefox bug tracker, an attacker searching for security patches increases the total window of vulnerability for Firefox 3 and 3.5 by factors of 9.4 and 10.1 over baseline, respectively.

B. Metadata Feature Analysis

Prior to evaluating the SVM-assisted ranker, we analyzed the ability of individual features to discriminate between security and non-security patches. We adopt the information theoretic information gain ratio, which reflects the decrease in entropy of the training set class labels when split by each individual feature (cf. Appendix B for details on information gain). The results are presented in Figures 9 and 12.

The individual features’ discriminative abilities are recorded in Figure 9. For the nominal features—author, top-level directory, file type, and day of week—we compute the information gain ratios directly, whereas for the remaining continuous features we use the gain ratio given by choosing the best threshold value. The author feature has the most discriminative power, providing a gain ratio 1.8 times larger than the next most informative feature. The next two most discriminative features are top-level directory and diff length, with the remaining features contributing less information.

Furthermore, observe that each individual feature alone provides only insignificant discriminative power, since the maximum information gain ratio is a tiny $3 \times 10^{-3}$. To add credence to these numbers, we note also that the unnormalized information gains (cf. Appendix B) have a similar ordering with the author feature coming out on top with an information gain of $2 \times 10^{-2}$, which corresponds to a small change in entropy. To summarize, we offer the following remark.

Remark 5.1: Some features provide discriminative power for separating security patches from non-security patches, with author, top-level directory, and diff length among the most discriminative. However, individually, no feature provides significant discriminative power for separating security patches from non-security patches.

To give intuition why some features provide discriminative power for security vs. non-security patches, we analyze in more detail the three most discriminative features: the author, top-level directory, and diff length.

For the author and top-level directory features, we analyze their influential feature values. For each occurring feature value, we compute its proportion value: the proportion of patches with that feature value that are security sensitive. Figures 10 and 11 depict the influential feature values for authors and top-level directory by ranking the feature values by their proportion values. During the life-cycle of Firefox 3, a total of 516 authors contributed patches out of which 38 contributed at least one security patch; only these 38 authors are shown in Figure 10. Notice that the top four authors (labeled) are all members of the Mozilla Security Group [4].

To explore the third most individually discriminative feature, the continuous diff length, we plot the feature CDFs for security and non-security patches in Figure 12. Since the diff length distribution is extremely tail heavy (producing CDFs resembling step-functions) Figure 12 zooms in on the left portion of the CDF by plotting the curves for the first 6,500 (out of 7,500) unique diff lengths. From the relative positions of the CDFs, we observe that security patches have shorter diff lengths than non-security patches. This matches our expectations that patches that add features to Firefox require larger diffs.

Our feature analysis shows that no individual feature effectively predicts whether a patch is security-related: motivated attackers should look to more sophisticated statistical techniques to reduce the cost of finding security patches; and suggests that obfuscating individual features will not plug information leaks in the open-source life-cycle. Moreover certain features cannot be effectively obfuscated. For exam-
ordered Author values

ordered top-level dir. values

CDFs of diff lengths

SVM probability estimates

Figure 10. The authors who committed security patches, ordered by proportion of patches that are security patches. The top four authors are identified with their security and total patches along-side.

Figure 11. The top-level directories ordered by the proportion of patches that are security patches. The top four directories are identified with their security and total patches along-side.

Figure 12. The CDFs of the security and non-security diff lengths. The figure is “zoomed” in on the left, with the top 1,000 largest lengths not shown.

Figure 13. The time series of SVM probability estimates, with security patches and non-security patches delineated by color.

ple, the Mozilla Committer’s Agreement would be violated if developer names were redacted from mozilla-central.

C. Classifier Performance

Figure 13 depicts the time series of scores assigned to each patch by the SVM (the horizontal axis shows the day when each patch is landed in the repository starting at 2008-09-24; at which point security patches were first announced). Note that as mentioned in Section IV-B we use an online learning approach, so the score assigned to a patch is only computed using the SVM trained with labeled patches seen up to the most recent security update prior to the patch landing in the repository (and including any out-of-release delayed disclosures occurring before the patch is landed). Notice that the scores for security and non-security patches in the first 50 days are quite similar. Over time, the SVM learns to assign high scores to a handful of vulnerability fixes (and a few non-security patches) and low scores to a handful of non-security patches. However, many patches are assigned very similar scores of around 0.01 irrespective of whether they fix vulnerabilities.

Viewed as a binary classifier, the SVM performs poorly because there is no sharp threshold that divides security patches from non-security patches. However, when viewed
in terms of the attacker’s utility, the SVM might still be useful in reducing effort because the relative rankings of the vulnerability fixes are generally higher than most non-security patches.

D. Cost-Benefit Analysis of SVM and Random Rankers

Attacker Effort. Figure 14 shows the time series of the effort the attacker expends to find a vulnerability (as measured by the number of patches the attacker examines), as described in Section III-B1. The attacker effort measured for a given day is computed to reflect the following estimate. Imagine, for example, an attacker who “wakes up” on a given day, trains an SVM on publicly available information (including all labeled patches before the current day), and then starts looking for security patches among all the (unlabeled) patches landed in the repository since the most recent security update, in rank order provided by the SVM. Then the attacker effort measured for a given day is the number of patches that the attacker has to examine before finding a security patch using the rank order provided by the SVM.

Each continuous segment in the graph corresponds to one of the 12 security updates during our study. For a period of time after each release, there are no security patches in mozilla-central, which is represented on the graph as a gap between the segments. For the first 50 days of the experiment both the random ranker and the SVM-assisted attacker expend relatively large amounts of effort to find security patches. This poor initial performance of the SVM, also observed in Figure 13, is due to insufficient training. The SVM, like any statistical estimator, requires enough data with which to generalize. Given the SVM’s “warm-up” effect during the first 50 days, all non-time-series figures in the sequel are shown using data after 2008-11-13 only.

Remark 5.2: During the latter 2/3rds of the year (the 8 month period starting 50 days after 2008-09-24) the SVM-assisted attacker, now with enough training data, regularly expends significantly less effort than an attacker who examines patches in a random order.

The general cyclic trends of the SVM-assisted and random rankers are also noteworthy. In most inter-update periods, the random ranker enjoys a relatively low attacker effort (though higher than the SVM’s) which quickly increases. The reason for this behavior can be understood by plotting the expected effort for the random ranker with respect to the
number of security patches for various total patch pool sizes as shown in Figure 5. Immediately after the landing of a first post-update security patch, the pool of available patches gets swamped by non-security patches (cf. Figure 2), corresponding to increasing $n$ in Figure 5 and greatly increasing the expectation. Further landings of security patches are few and far between (by virtue of the rarity of such patches), and so moving across the figure with increasing $n$ is rare. As the periods progress, non-security patches continue to swamp security patches. This trend for the random ranker’s expected effort is more directly seen in Figure 6 which plots expected effort over a prototypical cycle of Firefox 3. Over the single 31 day cycle, 39 patches land daily of which a constant proportion are security patches. The curve for $10^{-2}$ most closely represents Firefox 3 where the security patch rate is 0.0085 of the total patch rate. The trend observed empirically in Figure 14 matches both the overall shape and location of the predicted trend.

At times early on in the inter-release periods, the SVM-assisted attacker experiences the same upward trending effort, but eventually the developers land a security patch that resembles the training data. Given just one “easy” fix, the effort required of the SVM-assisted attacker plummets. In two cycles (and partially in two others) the SVM-assisted attacker must expend more effort than the random ranker. This is due to a combination of factors including the small rates of landing security patches which means that unreleased security patches may not resemble training data.

**Proportion of Days of Successful Vulnerability Discovery.** Figure 15 depicts the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of attacker effort, showing how often the SVM-assisted and random rankers can find a security patch as a function of effort. Note that the CDFs asymptote to 0.90 rather than 1.0 because mozilla-central did not contain any security patches during 10% of the 8 month period.

**Remark 5.3:** The SVM-assisted attacker discovers a security patch with the first examined patch for 34% of the 8 month period.

If the unassisted attacker expends the minimum effort of 18.5, it can only find security patches for less than 0.5% of the 8 month period. By contrast, an SVM-assisted attacker who examines 17 patches will find a security patch during 44% of the period. In order to find security patches for 22% of the 8 month period, the random ranker must examine on average up to 70.3 patches. The SVM-assisted attacker achieves significantly greater benefit than an attacker who examines patches in random order, when small to moderate numbers of patches are examined (i.e., up to 100 patches).

When examining 100 or more patches, the SVM-assisted and random rankers find security patches for similar proportions of the 8 month period, with the random ranker achieving slightly better performance.

**Total Increase to the Window of Vulnerability.** While the CDF of attacker effort measures how hard the attacker must work in order to find a patch that fixes a vulnerability, Figure 16 estimates the value of discovering a vulnerability by measuring the total increase to the window of vulnerability gained by an attacker who expends a given amount of effort each day (cf. Section III-B2). Note that this differs from the previous section by considering an attacker who aggregates work over multiple days, and who does not re-examine patches from day-to-day.

**Remark 5.4:** At 1 or 2 patches examined daily over the 8 month period, the SVM-assisted attacker increases the window of vulnerability by 89 or 148 days total, respectively. By contrast the random ranker must examine 3 or 7 patches a day (roughly 3 times the work) to achieve the approximate same benefit. At small budgets of 1 or 2 patches daily, the random ranker achieves window increases of 47 or 82 days which are just over half the SVM-assisted attacker’s benefits. At higher daily budgets of 7 patches or more, the two attackers achieve very similar benefits with the random ranker’s being insignificantly greater.

Compared to the Firefox 3 base-line vulnerability window size of 3.4 days (cf. Section III-B2), the increases to window size of 89 and 148 represent multiplicative increases by factors of 3.9 and 6.4 respectively.

**In Search of Severe Vulnerabilities.** Thus far, we have treated all vulnerabilities equally. In reality, attackers prefer to exploit higher severity vulnerabilities because those vulnerabilities let the attacker gain greater control over the user’s system. To evaluate how well the attacker fairs at finding severe vulnerabilities—those judged as either “high” or “critical” in impact—we measure the attacker effort required to find the first high or critical vulnerability (i.e., we ignore “low” and “moderate” vulnerabilities). Note that
we did not re-train the SVM on severe vulnerabilities even though re-training could lead to better results for the special case of discovering high-severity vulnerabilities. Figures 17–19 present our results for finding severe vulnerability fixes. The attacker effort time series for the SVM-assisted and random rankers are displayed in Figure 17. Overall, attacker effort curves are similar for all vulnerabilities, but shifted upwards away from 1 during several inter-update periods.

We can interpret the effect of focusing on severe vulnerabilities by examining the attacker effort CDFs in Figure 18. Although both attackers asymptote to the lower proportion of the period containing severe vulnerability fixes (down from 90% for identifying arbitrary vulnerabilities to 86%), only the random ranker’s CDF is otherwise relatively unchanged. The random ranker’s minimum effort has increased from 18.5 to 20.3 patches with a similarly low probability. The SVM-assisted attacker CDF undergoes a more drastic change. Examining one patch results in a vulnerability for 14% of the 8 month period, whereas an effort of 6 and 21 produce vulnerabilities for 20% and 34% of the 8 month period, respectively. To achieve these three proportions the random ranker must examine 48, 52, and 76 patches.

Remark 5.5: The SVM-assisted attacker is still able to outperform the random ranker in finding severe vulnerabili-
ties, in particular finding such security fixes 20% of the time by examining 6 patches.

The increases to the severe vulnerability window are shown for the two attackers in Figure 19. Again, we see a shift, with the SVM-assisted attacker continuing to outperform the random ranker on small budgets (except for a budget of 1 patch) or otherwise perform similarly.

Remark 5.6: By examining 2 patches daily during the 8 month period, the SVM-assisted attacker increases the vulnerability window by 131 days. By contrast the random ranker with budget 2 achieves an expected window increase of 72 days.

**Searching for Multiple Vulnerabilities.** An attacker searching for security patches might suffer from false negatives: the attacker might mistakenly take a security patch as a non-security patch; or an attacker may simply wish to examine more patches than represented by the attacker effort defined above. To model this situation, we considered the problem of finding 2 or 3 security patches instead of just one.

As depicted in Figures 20 and 22 finding 1, 2, or 3 security patches requires progressively more effort. When computing the increase to the window of vulnerabilities in Figure 22 we assume that the attacker’s analysis of the examined patches only turns up the 1st, 2nd and 3rd security fixes respectively.
To find 2 or 3 security patches over 34% of the 8 month period, the SVM-assisted attacker must examine 35 or 36 patches respectively.

Finally consider approximating the window of vulnerability achieved by an attacker examining a single patch daily with no false negatives. Examining 3 patches a day increases the total vulnerability window by 83 days even if the attacker’s analysis produces one false negative each day. Assuming two false negatives each day, examining 4 patches daily increases the window by 80 days total. Similarly increasing the window by 151 or 148 days, approximating the error-free result under a two patch per day budget, requires examining 12 or 18 patches daily when suffering one or two false negatives respectively.

E. Analysis Repeatability Over Independent Periods of Time

In the previous section we explore how an attacker can find vulnerabilities over the lifetime of a major release of a large open-source project. It is natural to ask: how repeatable are these results over subsequent releases? As a first step towards answering this question, we repeat our analysis on the complete life-cycle of Firefox 3.5.

While the Firefox 3.5 patch volumes correspond to roughly half those of the year-long period of active development on Firefox 3, it is possible that the patches’ metadata may have changed subtly, resulting in significant differences in SVM-assisted ranker performance. Changes to contributing authors, functions of top-level directories, diff sizes or other side-effects of changes to coding policies, time of day or day of week when patches tend to be landed, could each contribute to changes to the attacker’s performance. Given the similar rates of patch landings, one can expect the random ranker’s performance to be generally unchanged.

Figures 23–25 depict the cost-benefit analysis of the SVM-assisted and random rankers searching for vulnerabilities in Firefox 3.5. It is clear that similar performance to Firefox 3 is enjoyed. The CDFs of attacker effort displayed in Figure 24 show that while the random ranker’s performance is roughly the same as before, the SVM-assisted ranker’s performance at very low effort (1 or 2 patches) is inferior compared to Firefox 3, while the assisted attacker enjoys much better performance at low to moderate efforts.

Remark 5.7: The SVM-assisted attacker discovers a security patch in Firefox 3.5 by the third patch examined, for 22% of the 5.5 month period; by the 20th patch the SVM-assisted attacker finds a security patch for 50% of the period. By contrast the random ranker must examine 69.1 or 95 patches in expectation to find a security patch for these proportions of the 5.5 month period.

In a similar vein, the increase to the window of vulnerability achieved by the random ranker is comparable between Firefox 3 and 3.5 (correcting for the differences in release lifetimes), while the SVM-assisted attacker achieves superior performance (cf. Figure 25).

Remark 5.8: By examining one or two patches daily, the SVM-assisted ranker increases the window of vulnerability (in aggregate) by 97 or 113 days total (representing increases to the base vulnerability window of factors of 5.8 and 6.7 respectively). By contrast the random ranker achieves increases of 25.1 or 43.8 days total under the same budgets.

We may conclude from these results that the presented attacks on Firefox 3 are repeatable for Firefox 3.5, and we expect our analysis to extend to other major releases of Firefox and major open-source projects other than Firefox.

F. Feature Analysis Redux: Measuring the Effect of Obfuscation

In Section V-B we perform a filter-based feature analysis for discriminating between security patches and non-security patches. In this section we ask: what is the effect of obfuscating individual features? We answer this question through a wrapper-based feature analysis in which we perform the same simulation of an SVM-assisted ranker as above, but now with one feature removed.

Figure 26 depicts the attacker effort CDFs for the SVM-assisted ranker when trained with all features, and trained with either the author, top directory, file type, time of day, day of week, or the set of diff size features removed. We remove the number of characters in the diff, number of lines in the diff, number of files in the diff, and file size simultaneously, since we observed no difference when only one of these features was removed. A plausible explanation for this invariance would be high correlation among these features. Removing the author feature has the most negative impact on the attacker effort CDF, reducing the proportion by 0.12 on average over attacker efforts in [1, 464]. That is, on average over attacker efforts for 12% of the 8 month period a security patch is found by the SVM-assisted ranker trained with the author feature while the attacker without access to patch author information find no security patch. Removing the time of day has no significant effect; and removing the top directory, day of week, or file type have increasingly positive impacts on the overall attacker effort CDF. Despite libsvm’s use of cross-validation for tuning the SVM’s parameters, the positive improvements point to overfitting which could be a product of the high dimensionality of the learning problem together with a very small sample of security patches: as noted above, our goal is merely to lower bound the performance of an attacker assisted by machine learning.

The increase to the window of vulnerability achieved by an SVM-assisted attacker without access to individual features (or the group of diff size features) is shown in Figure 27. For some attacker efforts the increase is greater without certain features, but overall we see a more negative effect overall. The greatest negative effect is observed when removing the author feature: the increase in window size is
only 8 days less on average over attacker efforts in [1, 55] than when the author feature is included.

We thus draw the following conclusion, which agrees with the filter-based feature analysis presented in Section V-B.

Remark 5.9: Obfuscating the patch author has the greatest negative impact on the SVM-assisted ranker’s performance, relative to obfuscating other features individually. However the magnitude of impact is negligible.

As noted above, even if the impact of obfuscating patch authors were greater, doing so would violate the Mozilla Committer’s Agreement.

VI. IMPROVING THE SECURITY LIFE-CYCLE

In this section, we explore ways in which open-source projects can avoid information leaks in their security life-cycle. Instead of attempting to obfuscate metadata from would-be attackers, we recommend that open-source developers land vulnerability fixes in a “private” repository and use a set of trusted testers to ensure the quality of releases.

A. Workflow

A natural reaction to our experiments is to attempt to plug the information leaks by obfuscating patches. However, we argue that this approach does not scale well enough to prevent a sophisticated attacker from detecting security patches.
before announcement because an attacker can use standard machine learning techniques to aggregate information from a number of weak indicators. In general, it is difficult to predict how such a “cat-and-mouse” game would play out, but, in this case, the attacker appears to have significant advantage over the defender.

Instead of trying to plug each information leak individually, we recommend re-organizing the vulnerability lifecycle to prevent information about vulnerabilities from flowing to the public (regardless of how well the information is obfuscated). Instead of landing security patches in the public mozilla-central repository first, we propose landing them in a private release branch. This release branch can then be made public (and the security patches merged into the public repository) on the day the patch is deployed to users. This workflow reverses the usual integration path by merging security fixes from the release branch to mozilla-central instead of from mozilla-central to the release branch.

\subsection*{B. Quality Assurance}

The main cost of landing security patches later is that the patches receive less testing before release. When the Firefox developers land security patches in mozilla-central, those patches are tested by a large number of users who run nightly builds of Firefox. If a security patch causes a regression (for example, a crash), these users can report the issue to the Firefox developers before the patch is deployed to all users. The Firefox developers can then iterate on the patch and improve the quality of security updates (thereby making it less costly for users to apply security updates as soon as they are available).

Instead of having the public at large test security updates prior to release, we recommend that testing be limited to a set of trusted testers. Ideally, this set of trusted testers would be vetted by members of the security team and potentially sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding the contents of security updates. The size of the trusted tester pool is a trade-off between test coverage and the ease with which an attacker can infiltrate the pool, which is a risk management decision.

\subsection*{C. Residual Risks}

There are two residual risks with this approach. First, the bug report itself still leaks some amount of information because the bug is assigned a sequential bug number that the attacker can probe to determine when a security bug was filed. This information leak seems fairly innocuous. Second, the process leaks information about security fixes on the day the patch becomes available. This leak is problematic because not all users are updated instantaneously \cite{6}. However, disclosing the source code contained in each release is required by many open-source licenses. As a practical matter, source patches are easier to analyze than binary-only patches, but attackers can reverse engineer vulnerabilities from binaries alone \cite{1}. One way to mitigate this risk is to update all users as quickly as possible \cite{6}.

\section*{VII. Conclusions}

Landing security patches in public source code repositories significantly increases the window of vulnerability of open-source projects. Even though security patches are landed amid a cacophony of non-security patches, we show that an attacker can exploit patch description fields linking to bug reports to immediately find a security patch on almost
any day of the year. If patch descriptions are obfuscated, off-the-shelf machine learning can find security patches from patch metadata such as author. By examining a nominal number of patches daily, these attackers increase the total window of vulnerability for Firefox by factors of 6 to 10 over the baseline window due to deployment latency.

A natural reaction to these findings is to obfuscate more features in an attempt to make the security patches harder to identify. However, our analysis shows that no single feature contains much information about whether a patch fixes a vulnerability; and even if all patch metadata is obfuscated, a random ranker can effectively increase the total window of vulnerability by a factor of 4. Instead of obfuscating patch metadata, we recommend changing the security life-cycle of open-source projects to avoid landing security patches in public repositories. We suggest landing these fixes in private repositories and having a pool of trusted testers test security updates.

Our recommendations reduce the openness of open-source projects by withholding some patches from the community until the project is ready to release those patches to end users. However, open-source projects already recognize the need to withhold some security-sensitive information from the community (as evidenced by these projects limiting access to security bugs to a vetted security group). In a broad view, limiting access to the security patches themselves prior to release is a small price to pay to significantly reduce the window of vulnerability for open-source software.

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APPENDIX

A. Proofs for the Random Ranker

Here we derive expressions for the random ranker’s expected cost (attacker effort) and benefit (increase to vulnerability window).

1) Proof of Random Ranker Expected Effort: If the ranker’s sampling were performed with replacement, then the distribution of attacker effort would be geometric with known expectation. Without replacement, if there are $n$ patches in the pool, $n_s$ of which fix vulnerabilities, $X$ has probability mass

$$
Pr(X = x) = \frac{(n-n_s)!}{(n-x-n_s+1)!} \cdot \frac{(n-x+1)!}{n!} \cdot \frac{n_s}{n-x+1}, \quad (2)
$$

for $x \in \{1, \ldots, n-n_s+1\}$ and zero otherwise. The second equality follows from some simple algebra. The first equality is derived as follows. The probability of the first draw being a non-security patch is the number of non-security patches over the number of patches or $(n-n_s)/n$. Conditioned on the first patch not fixing a vulnerability, the second draw has probability $(n-n_s-1)/(n-1)$ of being non-security related since one fewer patch is in the pool (which is, in particular a non-security patch). This process continues with the $k^{th}$ draw having (conditional) probability $(n-n_s-k+1)/(n-1)$;
$k + 1$) of being a non-security patch. After drawing $k$ non-security patches, the probability of selecting a patch that fixes a vulnerability is $n_s/(n-k)$. Equation (3) follows by chaining these conditional probabilities.

With $X$’s probability mass in hand, the expectation can be efficiently computed for any moderate $(n, n_s)$ pair by summing Equation (5).

2) Random Ranker’s Expected Increase to the Window of Vulnerability: We begin by constructing the distribution of the first day an undisclosed vulnerability fix is found after a security update, when the random ranker is constrained to a budget $b$ of patches daily, and never re-examines patches. Let $n_t$ and $n_{t,s}$ denote the number of new patches and new vulnerability fixes landed on day $t \in \mathbb{N}$. Let random variable $X_{t,s}^n$ be the attacker effort required to find one of $n_s$ vulnerability fixes out of a pool of $n$ patches as described above. Finally, let $A_t$ be the event that the first vulnerability fix is found on day $t \in \mathbb{N}$. Then trivially

$$\Pr(A_1) = \Pr(X_{1,1}^n \leq b).$$

Now we may condition on $\neg A_1$ to express the probability of $A_2$ occurring: if $A_1$ does not occur then $b$ non-security-related patches are removed from the pool, so that the pool consists of $n_1, s + n_1, s$ vulnerability fixes and $n_1 + n_2 - b$ patches total. The conditional probability of $A_2$ given $\neg A_2$ is then the probability of $\{X_{1,1}^n + n_2 - b \leq b\}$. By induction we can continue to exploit this conditional independence to yield for all $t > 0$

$$\Pr(A_{t+1} | \neg A_1 \cap \ldots \cap \neg A_t) = \Pr(X_{t+1,1}^n - \sum_{i=1}^t n_i \leq b) \cdot \prod_{j=1}^t \left(1 - \Pr(X_{t+1,1}^n - (j-1)b \leq b)\right).$$ (4)

The RHS of this expression is easily calculated by summing Equation (3) over $x \in [b]$. The unconditional probability distribution now follows from the mutual exclusivity of the $A_t$ and the chain rule of probability

$$\Pr(A_{t+1}) = \Pr(A_{t+1} \cap \neg A_t \cap \ldots \cap \neg A_t) = \Pr(A_{t+1} \cap \neg A_t \cap \ldots \cap \neg A_t) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{t+1} \Pr(A_i | \sum_{i=1}^{t+1} n_i) \leq b)
\prod_{j=1}^t \left(1 - \Pr(X_{t+1,1}^n - (j-1)b \leq b)\right) .$$

Thus we need only compute the expression in Equation (5) once for each $t \in \mathbb{N}$, where $N$ is the number of days until the next security update. From these conditional probabilities we can efficiently calculate the unconditional $\Pr(A_t)$ for each $t \in \mathbb{N}$. Noting that $A_t$ implies an increase of

$$Y = N - t + 1$$
to the window of vulnerability, the expected increase is

$$\mathbb{E}[Y] = \sum_{t=1}^N (N - t + 1) \Pr(A_t).$$ (5)

Remark A.1: Notice that there can be a non-trivial probability that no vulnerability fix will be found by the random ranker in the $N$ day period. This probability is simply $1 - \sum_{t=1}^N \Pr(A_t)$. On typical inter-update periods this probability can be higher than 0.5 for budgets $\approx 1$. This fact serves to reduce the expected increase to the window of vulnerability, particularly for small budgets.

Remark A.2: The astute reader will notice that we removed $b$ non-security-related patches from the pool on all days we do not find a vulnerability fix, irrespective of whether $b$ or more such patches are present. We have assumed that $n$ is large for simplicity of exposition. Once $n$ drops to $n_s + b$ or lower, we remove all non-security-related patches upon failing to find a vulnerability fix. On the next day, the probability of finding a vulnerability fix is unity. The probabilities of finding vulnerability fixes on subsequent days are thus zero. Thus as $b$ increases, the distribution becomes more and more concentrated at the start of the inter-update period as we would expect. Finally, if no vulnerability fixes are present in the pool on a particular day, then the probability of finding such a patch is trivially zero.

B. Feature Analysis

The information theoretic quantity known as the information gain measures how well a feature separates a set of training data, and is popular in information retrieval and in machine learning within the ID3 and C4.5 decision tree learning algorithms [13].

For training set $S$ and nominal feature $F$ taking discrete values in $X_F$, the information gain is defined as

$$\text{Gain}(S, F) = \text{Entropy}(S) - \sum_{x \in X_F} \left|S_{x,F}\right| \frac{\text{Entropy}(S_{x,F})}{|S|},$$ (6)

where $S_t$ denotes the multiset of $S$’s example binary labels, $S_{t,x,F}$ denotes the subset of these labels for examples with feature $F$ value $x$, and for multiset $T$ taking possible values in $X$ we have the usual definition of \text{Entropy}(T) = \sum_{x \in X} \frac{|T_x|}{|T|} \log_2 \frac{|T_x|}{|T|}$. The first term of the information gain, the entropy of the training set, corresponds to the impurity of the examples’ labels. A pure set with only one repeated label has zero entropy, while a set having half positive examples and half negative examples has a maximum entropy of one. The information gain’s second term corresponds to the expected entropy of the training set conditioned on the value of feature $F$. Thus a feature having a high information gain corresponds to a large drop in entropy, meaning that splitting on that feature resulting in
a partition of the training set into subsets of like labels. A 
low (necessarily non-negative) information gain corresponds
to a feature that is not predictive of class label.

Two issues require modification of the basic information
gain before use in practice [13]. The first is that nominal
features $F$ with large numbers of discrete values $|X_F|$ tend
to have artificially inflated information gains (being as high
as $\log_2 |X_F|$) since splitting on such features can lead to
numerous small partitions of the training set with trivially
pure labels. An example is the author feature, which has
close to 500 values. In such cases it is common practice to
correct for this artificial inflation by using the information
gain ratio [14] as defined below. We use $S_F$ to denote
the multiset of examples’ feature $F$ values in the ratio’s
denominator, which is known as the split information.

$$ \text{GainRatio}(S, F) = \frac{\text{Gain}(S, F)}{\text{Entropy}(S_F)} . \quad (7) $$

The second issue comes from taking the idea of many-valued
nominal features to the extreme: continuous features
such as the diff length (of which there are 7,572 unique
values out of 14,541 patches in our dataset) and the file
size (which enjoys 12,795 unique values) are analyzed by
forming a virtual binary feature for each possible threshold
on the feature. The information gain (ratio) of a continuous
feature is defined as the maximum information gain (ratio)
of any induced virtual binary feature [15].