Metal: A Metadata-Hiding File Sharing System
Weikeng Chen and Raluca Ada Popa
EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2020-11
January 10, 2020
http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2020/EECS-2020-11.pdf
<p>File sharing systems like Dropbox offer insufficient privacy since a compromised server can see the file content in the clear. Though encryption can hide such content from the servers, metadata leakage remains significant. It is promising to develop a file sharing system that hides such metadata--including user identities and file access patterns.</p>
<p>Metal is the first file sharing system that hides such metadata from malicious users with a latency of only a few seconds. The core of Metal is <i>a new two-server multi-user ORAM scheme</i>, which is secure against malicious users, together with metadata-hiding access control and file sharing.</p>
<p>Compared with the state-of-the-art malicious-user file sharing scheme PIR-MCORAM (which does not hide user identities), Metal hides the user identities and is 500x faster (in terms of amortized latency) or 10^5x faster (in terms of worst-case latency).</p>
Advisors: Raluca Ada Popa
BibTeX citation:
@mastersthesis{Chen:EECS-2020-11, Author= {Chen, Weikeng and Popa, Raluca Ada}, Title= {Metal: A Metadata-Hiding File Sharing System}, School= {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley}, Year= {2020}, Month= {Jan}, Url= {http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2020/EECS-2020-11.html}, Number= {UCB/EECS-2020-11}, Note= {Dedicated to my family members: Qiaozhu, Binbin, Wenkeng, Weijun, and Zirui.}, Abstract= {<p>File sharing systems like Dropbox offer insufficient privacy since a compromised server can see the file content in the clear. Though encryption can hide such content from the servers, metadata leakage remains significant. It is promising to develop a file sharing system that hides such metadata--including user identities and file access patterns.</p> <p>Metal is the first file sharing system that hides such metadata from malicious users with a latency of only a few seconds. The core of Metal is <i>a new two-server multi-user ORAM scheme</i>, which is secure against malicious users, together with metadata-hiding access control and file sharing.</p> <p>Compared with the state-of-the-art malicious-user file sharing scheme PIR-MCORAM (which does not hide user identities), Metal hides the user identities and is 500x faster (in terms of amortized latency) or 10^5x faster (in terms of worst-case latency).</p>}, }
EndNote citation:
%0 Thesis %A Chen, Weikeng %A Popa, Raluca Ada %T Metal: A Metadata-Hiding File Sharing System %I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley %D 2020 %8 January 10 %@ UCB/EECS-2020-11 %U http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2020/EECS-2020-11.html %F Chen:EECS-2020-11